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HANGING UP TOO EARLY: REMEDIES TO 
REDUCE ROBOCALLS 
Maria G. Hibbard1 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite the prevalence of the National Do Not Call Registry, 
telemarketing still plagues millions of Americans. “Rachel” from 
“Cardholder Services” has a constant presence in American homes. 
Inevitably, “Rachel,” a theoretical representative from “Cardholder 
Services”2 or a “government agency,” will call families with a prerecorded 
telemarketing message just as a family is sitting down to dinner. Some 
consumers attempt to report these “robocalls,”3 but the callers are 
persistent. Even if a phone number is on the Do Not Call Registry, Rachel 
and Ann keep calling back, night after night.4 Because “Cardholder 
Services” or another similar company has spoofed, or faked, the number, 
the calls are hard to trace and even harder to stop. The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) Chairman Jon Leibowitz claimed, “[a]t the FTC, 
Rachel from Cardholder Services is public enemy number one.”5 Although 
 
1. J.D. Candidate 2014, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I would 
like to thank Professor Erik Jensen for his guidance regarding this Note and my 
family and friends for their constant love and support.  
2. The “Rachel” from “Cardholder Services” scam was settled in July 2013 after the 
FTC introduced five complaints against the companies associated with the scam 
in November 2012. It is used for illustration purposes throughout this Note 
because it is representative of many other similar telemarketing scams. See Press 
Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Settles ‘Rachel’ Robocall Enforcement Case 
(July 12, 2013).  
3. “Telemarketing calls” and “robocalls” are used interchangeably throughout this 
Note. Telemarketing calls are referenced in a number of different ways in the 
media, including “robocall, “spam call,” “telemarketers” or “automated calls.” 
“Robocall” is the shorthand name for telemarketing calls that is most relevant to 
this Note. See Robocalls, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/robocalls/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). The 
Federal Trade Commission also used “robocall” throughout its Summit on 
October 18, 2012 discussing the problem. 
4. See, e.g., Alina Tugend, Resilience of Robocalls Leaves a Lot of Ears Ringing, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/02/your-
money/telemarketing-calls-keep-mounting-up-along-with-consumer-
irritation.html?_r=0 (describing the failed attempts of consumers to stop the 
constant robocalls); Christina Chaey, The FTC Continues Its Crackdown on 
Robocall Scams, FAST CO. (Nov. 2, 2012), 
http://www.fastcompany.com/3002644/ftc-continues-its-crackdown-robocall 
scams (describing the annoying nature of constant robocalls). 
5. Chaey, supra note 4.  
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the individual calls themselves may be minor intrusions, the consistency 
and frequency of the calls frustrates many consumers nationwide.6 The 
robocalls drive some recipients to extreme behaviors, including asking for 
the automated caller’s home phone number, putting the call on speaker 
phone and screaming into the phone, and blowing a whistle into the phone.7 
One states, “[t]hose Rachel calls . . . I would like to murder that person.”8 
Another recipient of robocalls claimed, “I was getting more calls from 
robots than people.”9  
Although the FTC’s Do Not Call Registry, the national list of 
consumers who do not wish to receive telemarketing calls,10 has 
“significantly reduced the number of unwanted telemarketing calls . . . 
from legitimate marketers who honor the system and recognize the 
importance of respecting consumer choice,”11 illegitimate companies and 
telemarketers with fraudulent intent continue to abuse the market with 
growing frequency.12 From January through June 2012, over 1.2 million 
fraudulent robocalls were reported—a 29% increase from the same period 
in 2011.13 Despite telemarketing regulations prohibiting such calls, there is 
“an increase in calls from fraudsters who are apparently willing to both 
violate the laws against robocalls and ignore the Do Not Call Registry.”14  
As the Do Not Call Registry reaches its tenth birthday, another serious 
assessment of telemarketing regulation is warranted. Although the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act originally gave the FCC authority to 
create a national do-not-call list, a national list was not created until 2003, 
when the Do Not Call Implementation Act gave the FTC authority to create 
 
6. Tugend, supra note 4 (detailing consumer behaviors as a result of robocalls). 
7. Id. (describing the unorthodox methods consumers employ to combat robocalls). 
8. Id. 
9. Adrianne Jeffries, Who Can Stop Robocalls? FTC Tries to Crowdsource a 
Solution but Falls Flat, THE VERGE (Jan. 28, 2013), 
http://www.theverge.com/2013/1/28/3924544/who-can-stop-robocalls-ftcs-
attempt-to-crowdsource-a-solution-falls. 
10. See NATIONAL DO NOT CALL REGISTRY, https://donotcall.gov (last visited Mar. 
16, 2013) (allowing phone number registration and providing a mechanism for 
filing complaints. 
11. Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Introductory Remarks at 
Robocalls: All The Rage Summit (Oct. 18, 2012). 
12. This Note focuses on commercial robocalling. Issues related to robocalling from 
political candidates, most frequent during election seasons, are beyond the scope 
of this Note.  
13. Vijay Balasubramaniyan, Caller ID Spoofing and Caller Authentication (Oct. 18, 
2012), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/robocalls-
all-rage-ftc-summit/robocalls-part5-caller-id-spoofing.pdf. 
14. Kati Daffan, Answering Your Questions About Robocalls, U.S. GOVERNMENT 
BLOG (Aug. 28, 2012), blog.usa.gov/post/3039077932/answering-your-questions-
about-robocalls. 
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and enforce such a list.15 With authority divided between the FCC and 
FTC, both agencies constantly revised their respective telemarketing 
regulations throughout the 2000s in an attempt to reach regulatory 
consistency.16 However, constant revisions and inconsistent standards have 
left consumers frustrated, telemarketers confused, and efforts to enforce 
fraudulent telemarketing delayed.17 The regulatory authority of both 
agencies–and the First Amendment issues associated with regulating 
commercial speech–has been challenged in court throughout the last 
decade.18 Any valuable analysis of telemarketing regulation must weigh the 
interests of the government, the free speech of the telemarketer, and the 
individual consumer’s right to be free from unwanted intrusions in the 
home.  
In particular, an evaluation of the legal and technical solutions 
available to consumers is needed regarding the influx of telemarketing calls 
made in the form of automated, pre-recorded voice messages. These 
messages, already illegal, are often the hardest to track and prevent as they 
are routed through faked numbers and blocked locations.19 The FTC 
acknowledged the exigency of the issue when it announced a nationwide 
“Robocall Challenge” in late 2012, encouraging individuals and small 
businesses to develop a technical solution to reduce robocalling for a cash 
prize of $50,000.20 While this contest was widely heralded in the media as 
innovative21 and brought robocalling into the public eye, this Note 
advocates that the technical solution developed for the purpose of the 
 
15. See infra text accompanying note 91 (describing the collaborative effort by the 
FTC and FCC to create the Do-Not-Call Implementation Act in 2003). 
16. See infra text accompanying note 89 (“while a period of relative rulemaking calm 
followed the promulgation of the TSR, both the FTC and the FCC began 
rulemaking revisions to regulate telemarketing at a rapid pace in the early 
2000’s). 
17. See Tugend, supra note 4. Julianne Pepitone, FCC Cracks Down On Cell Phone 
Robocalls, CNN MONEY (Mar. 15, 2013), 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/03/15/technology/mobile/fcc-
robocalls/?source=cnn_bin (referencing the “FCC’s enforcement efforts and 
contest to find the best solution for robocalls.” This information is incorrect. The 
FTC coordinates enforcement efforts and initiated the Robocall Challenge. This 
article, published on a national news media site, is only one example of 
misinformation provided to consumers about robocalls). 
18. See infra Part III (detailing the judicial history of challenges to the FTC and 
FCC’s regulatory authority). 
19. See infra text accompanying notes 32-33 (describing the methods Robocallers use 
to make it difficult to trace their calls). 
20. See Press Release, FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC Challenges Innovators to Do Battle 
with Robocallers (Oct. 18, 2012).  
21. See Tod Sperry, Feds Offer $50,000 Prize For New Plan To Block Robocalls, 
CNN (Oct. 18, 2012), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/18/us/robocall-
contest/index.html (outlining the FTC robocall challenge). See also Chaey, supra 
note 4 (outlining the FTC effort to crackdown on Robocalls). 
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contest is only part of the solution.22 Part I of this Note will address the 
technologies and processes associated with robocalling and the impact 
these technologies have on the rise of robocalls. Part II will analyze the 
current statutory and regulatory structure that addresses robocalling and the 
detrimental effect of inconsistent regulation. Part III will consider these 
regulations—and a potential ban on robocalling – in light of First 
Amendment considerations. Part IV will weigh the pros and cons of a 
sampling of proposed solutions to reduce robocalls. Finally, Part V will 
address potential legal, technical, and practical remedies to reduce 
robocalls.  
I. CURRENT ROBOCALL TECHNOLOGIES ARE QUICKLY 
OUTPACING THE LAW 
Unlike traditional “live” telemarketing, robocalls allow companies to 
reach thousands of potential consumers in a short period of time. Formally 
defined as “a telephone call from an automated source that delivers a 
prerecorded message to a large number of people,”23 a robocall can include 
an entirely prerecorded message, offer a prerecorded message after a 
consumer responds in some way, or offer a prerecorded message before 
transferring the call to a live operator. This flexibility allows companies to 
easily and cheaply record a message offering a specific product or service, 
send out hundreds of calls at the same time, and monitor which calls may 
lead to possible business.24  
While traditional marketing “cold calls” involve one live telemarketer 
and one consumer, a robocalling scheme usually involves at least three 
players. A marketing company or agent first obtains a list of phone 
numbers before sending it to a “qualifier.”25 This “qualifier,” or lead 
generator, is either a person or a machine, and pares down the list of phone 
numbers that are sent to a predictive dialer.26 After a consumer answers the 
phone or responds to the call, the call may be transferred to a live 
 
22. Challenge Dates, FTC ROBOCALL CHALLENGE, 
http://robocall.challenge.gov/details/dates (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).  
23. Robocall, MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/robocall (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) (stating that the first 
known use of the word was in 1993). 
24. See Alicia Hatfield, Note, Phoney Business: Successful Caller ID Spoofing 
Regulation Requires More than the Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, 19 J.L. & 
POL’Y 827, 840 (2010). See also Henning Schulzrinne, Chief Tech. Officer, Fed. 
Commc’ns Comm’n, The Network Presentation at Robocalls All The Rage: An 
FTC Summit (Oct. 18, 2012) (arguing that an attractive feature of robocalling is 
its cheap transport costs). 
25. These numbers could be numbers from its own marketing activities, numbers 
purchased from the Do Not Call Registry, or numbers of specific groups of 
individuals, such as seniors or people with financial difficulties.   
26. See Schulzrinne, supra note 24.  
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telemarketing agent.27 Then, the agent may try to complete a sale or ask for 
a consumer’s information,28 tagging the number as one that is more likely 
to respond.29 “By the time the call reaches a live human agent . . . you 
already have somebody. . . [who is] willing to at least listen to the pitch.”30 
By remaining on the line, pressing a button, or responding to the call in 
some other way, the consumer essentially marks his or her phone number 
as receptive to future marketing calls.31 Many telemarketers capitalize on 
the counterintuitive nature of this process: “if you press whatever button 
they offer to actually get out of it, what it means really is you’ve just 
qualified yourself even more so for the next call.”32  
While the many steps in this process may disguise a robocall as a 
complicated endeavor, the automated nature of the calls allows each step to 
be located in a different place from the rest of the system.33 Because the 
qualifier may be in one city while the agent is in another, robocalls are 
necessarily harder to track; phone companies sell the predictive dialers, 
caller identification blockers, and other equipment that allow telemarketers 
to make calls without being traced.34 Even if the same number calls the 
same consumer more than once, existing technology makes it difficult for 
the consumer to report the fraudulent number.  
Because a phone number is not tied to a specific landline,35 a number 
may be faked or “spoofed” to display an incorrect phone number on a 
consumer’s caller ID.36 Although caller identification technologies have 
 
27. Id. 
28. Hatfield, supra note 24, at 830-31. 
29. This technique leads to the same numbers; often the least receptive consumers,  
repeatedly receiving the most robocalls from the same numbers. 
30. Schulzrinne, supra note 24.  
31. This philosophy is exactly the opposite of the perspective taken by the consumers 
referenced in this Note’s introduction; by responding to the robocall or remaining 
on the line, consumers are more likely to receive additional phone calls from the 
same marketing companies. Id. (noting that individuals are “at least willing to 
listen to the pitch.”). 
32. Id.  
33. Id. (nothing that a call can be routed someplace completely different).  
34. See Telemarketing and The Telephone Consumer Protection Act, ELECTRONIC 
INFORMATION PRIVACY CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/telemarketing/ (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2014) (Predictive dialers, as described by Ameritech Predictive 
Dialers, allow companies to “place calls specified by your computer database, 
screen non-productive calls such as busy signals, answering machines and no 
answers, and connect your agents with live respondents.” Another service, Quest 
Residential “New Telephone Hookups” Marketing List, “provides detailed 
information about new residents within 24 hours of their arrival so you can reach 
them first.”). 
35. In VoIP software, the phone call is made through an internet connection.  
36. Hatfield, supra note 24, at 836.   
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previously helped consumers screen some unwanted sales calls,37 
technologies that block numbers or insert a fraudulent number prevent 
caller identification from successfully eliminating robocalls. While a 
consumer may think that a telephone number originates from his or her 
home area code – increasing the likelihood some consumers would answer 
the unknown number – any attempt to return the call will result in an error 
message.38 If the marketing company has obtained a specific list of 
numbers, it may attempt to imitate a well-known or trustworthy number to 
the consumer, such as the Social Security Administration, a doctor,39 or 
placing a call “on behalf of the police or homeowners’ association.”40 
Robocalls are increasingly more efficient and harder to track as a result of 
this process as this false or misleading information masks the caller’s true 
identity or the calls’ origin.41 In fact, “although technology has improved to 
assist consumers in blocking unwanted calls, it has also evolved in such a 
way as to assist telemarketers in making greater numbers of calls and even 
circumventing such blocking technologies.”42 As a result, “it is impossible 
to trace spoofed calls except by subpoenaing the spoofing company’s 
records to determine the identity of the customer.”43 Text-based spoofing, 
or SMS spoofing, is accomplished through the same process; although the 
information is within a text that can be stored in a cell phone, the text 
contains information that is impossible to trace.44  
Telemarketers can make these calls cheaply and quickly thanks to 
Voice-Over-IP (VoIP) or internet-based calling software such as Skype and 
Google Voice. VoIP reduces geographic restrictions and removes the 
expense associated with landlines.45 VoIP-originated calls are now the most 
 
37. Vanessa Miller, Robocalls Complicate Do-Not-Call Rules in Iowa, THE 
GAZETTE (Jan. 23, 2013, 6:30AM), thegazette.com/2013/01/23/robocalls-
complicate-do-not-call-rules-in-iowa/ (“Johnson said caller identification has 
been a great way to screen out unwanted sales calls in the past . . .”).  
38. Id. 
39. See Schulzrinne, supra note 24 (noting that a company may use the numbers of an 
“entity where the call person is more likely to both pick up the phone and believe, 
at least initially, the sales pitch.”).  
40. Better Business Bureau of Southern Arizona, Consumers’ Phones Being Flooded 
with Illegal ‘Robocalls,’ TUSCON CITZEN (Jan. 15, 2013), 
tusconctizen.com/bbbconsumeralert/2013/15/consumers-phones-being-flooded-
with-illegal-robocalls.  
41. Schulzrinne, supra note 24. Hatfield, supra note 24, at 831-32. 
42. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CG DOCKET NO. 02-278, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND 
REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 
1991, at 30 (Feb. 15, 2012). 
43. See Hatfield, supra note 24, at 831. 
44. See id. at 832-33 (explaining how text message spoofing is accomplished and 
why this technique is difficult to trace).  
45. See Vijay Balasubramaniyan, The Network Presentation at  Robocalls All The 
Rage: An FTC Summit  (Oct. 18, 2012) (“The reason they are using Voice over 
IP . . . is [it] allows you to be anonymous, . . . [it is] largely automatic, and it’s 
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common type of robocalls, representing 46% of all reported robocalls.46 
Ultimately, “with the combination of [VoIP] calls, cloud computing, auto 
dialing software, and other advances, it is now possible to make robocalls 
for one cent per call or less.”47 Because of the cheap methods for 
transporting information, the easy access to blocking equipment and 
software, and the minimal live labor required, robocalling is an ideal tool 
for companies looking to reach the maximum number of consumers at 
minimal cost.48 As robocalling technology continues to advance, 
telemarketing statutory and regulatory structure must progress as well.  
II. CURRENT TELEMARKETING REGULATORY AND STATUTORY 
STRUCTURE: HANGING UP TOO EARLY 
A. The Telemarketing Consumer Protection Act of 1991 Introduces 
Federal Telemarketing Regulation 
Before The Telemarketing Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), 
a patchwork of state laws regulated telemarketing with varying levels of 
severity and enforcement.49 Although some state statutes and do-not-call 
lists were both effective means of reducing telemarketing calls, others were 
“so riddled with exceptions that the law had been rendered ‘practically 
unenforceable.’”50 The TCPA does not preempt state law,51 but it 
introduced broad federal telemarketing regulation authorizing the FCC to 
enact rules to regulate telemarketing in greater detail.52 TCPA was 
 
extremely inexpensive.” Further explains that Voice over IP allows users to select 
the geographic area they want to call.”).  
46. See id. (presenting a chart outlining the most frequent methods of robocalling). 
47. Daffan, supra note 14. 
48. See Schulzrinne, supra note 24 (“[W]e have three key components that make 
robocalling particularly attractive now and increasingly so; normally with cheap 
transport in switching, the ability to spoof numbers, and because of the ability to 
move internationally, to use cheap labor where labor is necessary . . . . Those 
three things are what make robocalling much more scalable then the old boiler 
room ever was.”).  
49. See Jason C. Miller, Note, Regulating Robocalls: Are Automated Calls the Sound 
of, or a Threat to, Democracy? 16 MICH. TELECOM. TECH. L. REV. 213, 231-32 
(2009) (“[M]ost states that do have regulations rarely enforce them, further 
adding to the confusion.”).  
50. Douglas C. Nelson, Note, The Do-Not-Call Implementation Act: Legislating the 
Sound of Silence, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 63, 66 (2003) (quoting Michael E. 
Shannon, Combatting Unsolicited Sales Calls: The “Do-Not-Call” Approach to 
Solving the Telemarketing Problem, 27 J. LEGIS. 381, 411 (2001)).  
51. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2006) 
(permitting party to bring claim in state court). 
52. Id. § 227(c) (“Within 120 days after December 20, 2001, the Commission shall 
initiate a rulemaking proceeding concerning the need to protect residential 
telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to 
which they object.”). 
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necessary because telemarketers’ were “avoid[ing] the restrictions of State 
law, simply by locating their phone centers out of state. Congress thus 
sought to put the TCPA on the same footing as state law, essentially 
supplementing state law where there were perceived jurisdictional gaps.”53 
TCPA specifically forbids calls “using an artificial or prerecorded voice to 
deliver a message without the prior express consent of the called party.”54 
The statute also forbids the use of predictive dialers to make commercial 
telemarketing calls. TCPA defines an “automatic telephone dialing system” 
as “equipment which has the capacity A) to store or produce telephone 
numbers to be called, using a random sequential number generator; and B) 
to dial such numbers.”55 Automated calls to cell phones are also 
specifically forbidden,56 but the legality of VoIP calls and text messages are 
not addressed.57 Although this prohibition seems rather broad, the TCPA 
exempts robocalls made for necessary mass communications such as 
weather emergencies, flight cancellations, and other calls that are not 
explicitly commercial.58  
 
53. Yuri R. Linetsky, Protection of “Innocent Lawbreakers:” Striking the Right 
Balance in the Private Enforcement of the Anti “Junk Fax” Provisions of the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 90 NEB L. REV. 70, 77 (2011) (quoting 
Bonime v. Avaya Inc., No. 06 CV 1630(CBA), 2006 E.D.N.Y. WL 3751219, at 
*5).  
54. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) (2006) (“It shall be unlawful for any person within the 
United States . . . to initiate any telephone call to any residential telephone line 
using an artificial or pre-recorded voice to deliver a message without the prior 
consent of the called party . . .”). 
55. Id. § 227(a) (defining “automatic telephone dialing system”).  
56. Id. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (forbidding automated calls made to cellular telephone 
services, or “any service for which the called party is charged for the call”). This 
provision may not be currently relevant, to pre-paid cell phone plans and 
unlimited minutes – unlike in older cell phone plans or landlines, consumers may 
not be specifically charged for each call.  
57. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CG DOCKET NO. 92-90, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND 
REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 
1991 (Sept. 17, 1992) (providing information on how developing technology 
might soon require the Commission to revise its rules “in order to more 
effectively carryout Congress’s directives in the TCPA”). VoIP and text message 
technology was not prevalent at the time of the enactment of the TCPA; the Act 
has not been revised since that time to include such technology. 
58. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(B) (2006) (listing specific prerecorded calls that are 
exempt from the statute). See also Robocalls, FED. TRADE COMM’N (2012), 
http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0259-robocalls (listing specific calls that 
are exempt from telemarketing regulation in general); 47 § 227 (b)(2)(B)(ii)(I-II) 
(2006) (advising that the FCC may proscribe rules that exempt categories of calls 
made for commercial purposes that “will not adversely affect the privacy rights 
that this section is intended to protect; and II) do not include the transmission of 
any unsolicited advertisement”). The definition of what is not ‘explicitly 
commercial’ is still debated—while telemarketers may argue that a call providing 
‘information’ about a product is not explicitly commercial, it most often delivers 
an additional message asking a consumer to purchase something or offer credit 
card information in exchange for some ‘free’ product or service. 
Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet · Vol. 5 · 2014  
Hanging Up Too Early 
87 
The TCPA mandates the FCC to “consider prescribing regulations to 
allow businesses to avoid receiving calls made using an artificial or 
prerecorded voice to which they have not given their prior express 
consent.”59 It also specifically authorizes the FCC to create exempt from 
regulation calls that are not made for a commercial purpose, calls that “will 
not adversely affect the privacy rights that this section is intended to 
protect,” and calls that do not include the transmission of unsolicited 
advertisement.60 Consumers with “an established business relationship”61 
with a company may receive telemarketing calls from that company. 
Finally, the TCPA gives the FCC authority to establish a single national 
do-not-call database62 if it should find that it is an “effective and efficient”63 
remedy to accomplish the purposes of the act. Although a long road of 
rulemaking and revisions was ahead, Congress took the first step in 
creating uniform national telemarketing policy with the passage of federal 
telemarketing legislation.  
 
59. Id. § 227(b)(2)(A). See also supra Part (II)(V) (noting that although the 1991 act 
gives the FCC this power, the FCC did not enact similar regulations to this end 
until early 2012—nearly 19 years later). 
60. Id. § 227(B)(2)(A-B) (listing the exceptions from the statute). 
61. Id. § 227(b)(2)(G) (giving free reign to the Commission to determine the details 
of this ‘established business relationship;’ the Act lists a number of factors for the 
Commission to consider, including considering the number of complaints the 
Commission has received, the benefits of establishing such a relationship, and the 
possible costs of such a limitation on small businesses). See also 47 C.F.R. § 
64.1200(f)(5) (2013) (defining an ‘established business relationship’ as “a prior or 
existing relationship formed by a voluntary two-way communication between a 
person or entity and a residential subscriber with or without an exchange of 
consideration, on the basis of the subscriber’s purchase or transaction with the 
entity within the eighteen months immediately preceding the date of the telephone 
call or on the basis of the subscriber’s inquiry or application regarding products or 
services offered by the entity within the three months immediately preceding the 
date of the call, which relationship has not been previously terminated by the 
party.”).   
62. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(3) (2006) (granting the FCC authority to establish “a single 
national database to compile a list of telephone numbers of residential subscribers 
who object to receiving telephone solicitations, and to make that compiled list and 
parts thereof available for purchase.”). 
63. Id. § 227(c)(1)(E) (“Within 120 days after December 20, 1991, the Commission 
shall initiate a rulemaking proceeding concerning the need to protect residential 
telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to 
which they object. The proceeding shall . . . develop proposed regulations to 
implement the methods and procedures that the Commission determines are most 
effective and efficient to accomplish the purposes of this section.”). 
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B. The FCC’s Initial Telemarketing Rules of 1992: Minimal 
Rulemaking Following National Legislation 
After the passage of the TCPA, the FCC promulgated its first set of 
telemarketing rules in 1992.64 Although the TCPA gave the FCC power to 
establish a national do-not-call registry,65 the FCC instead required 
businesses to begin to maintain business-specific do-not-call lists that 
honored consumer requests to be excluded from calls from an individual 
company for ten years from the date of the request.66 Among other 
restrictions, these rules also require identification of “the individual, or 
other entity, that is responsible for initiating the call, and include a contact 
phone number”67 at the beginning of the call, restrict calling hours to after 8 
a.m. or before 9 p.m., and require telemarketers to initiate adequate training 
processes for employees to comply with these restrictions.68 These 
business-specific do-not-call lists fulfilled the requirements of the TCPA 
but added to consumer confusion. Throughout the 1990s, consumers could 
add their phone numbers to multiple company do-not-call lists and multiple 
state do-not-call lists (if they existed), but continued to receive fraudulent 
pre-recorded marketing calls.69  
C. The Telemarketing Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act: 
Preventing Fraud, But Adding Confusion  
Only three years after the TCPA was passed, Congress by passing the 
Telemarketing Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act (TCFAPA) in 
1994.70 Another congressional act became necessary since “interstate 
telemarketing fraud has become a problem of such magnitude”71 that 
“consumers . . . are estimated to lose $40 billion a year in telemarketing 
fraud,”72 and “consumers are victimized by other forms of telemarketing 
 
64. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CG DOCKET NO. 92-90, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND 
REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 
1991 (Sept. 18, 2002) (“In 1992, the Commission adopted rules implementing the 
TCPA, including the requirement that entities making telephone solicitations 
institute procedures for maintaining do-not-call lists.”). 
65. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(3) (2006) (giving the FCC authority to establish “a single 
national database”). 
66. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CG DOCKET NO. 92-90, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND 
REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 
1991, at 40-41 (Sept. 17, 1992). 
67. Miller, supra note 49, at 226; 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(b)(1)-(2) (2013). 
68. FED. COMMC’NS. COMM’N, CG DOCKET NO. 92-90, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND 
REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 
1991 (Sept. 17, 1992); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e)(1) (2013). 
69. See supra Part (II). 
70. Telemarketing Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-
6108 (2006).  
71. Id. § 6101(2) (stating the purposes of the act). 
72. Id. § 6101(3). 
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deception and abuse.”73 While the TCPA delegated authority to the FCC, 
the TCFAPA empowered the FTC to proscribe rules “prohibiting deceptive 
telemarketing acts.”74 Both the TCPA and include similar requirements for 
FTC rulemaking. However, the TCFAPA also prohibits “calls which the 
reasonable consumer would consider coercive or abusive of such 
consumer’s right to privacy,”75 restrictions on the hours of the day when 
calls can be made,76 and prompt disclosure of the telemarketer and the 
purpose of the call.77 Violations of any of these guidelines could qualify as 
“abusive” telemarketing; abusive telemarketing can constitute any call 
made to a consumer who has previously stated that he or she does not wish 
to receive a call.78  
Although it also does not preempt state law, the TCFAPA does not 
address its interaction with the TCPA or any existing FCC rules; the rest of 
the act deals only with Securities and Exchange Commission rules and 
addresses state and private rights of action.79 While the title of the 
TCFAPA implies an added emphasis on telephone fraud, it does no more to 
address fraudulent telemarketing practices besides giving another federal 
agency rulemaking power. Under the TCFAPA, the FTC was given a year 
to enact appropriate rules.80 With both federal and state telemarketing 
statutes, FCC rules, and forthcoming FTC rules, the maze of telemarketing 
regulation continued to grow.  
D. Telemarketing Sales Rule: The FTC Joins Telemarketing 
Rulemaking 
Following the passage of the TCFAPA, the FTC also promulgated its 
own telemarketing rules, called the “Telemarketing Sales Rule” (TSR), in 
1995.81 Defined relatively narrowly, telemarketing is described in the rule 
as “a plan, program, or campaign which is conducted to induce the 
purchase of goods or services or a charitable contribution, by use of one or 
 
73. Id. § 6101(4). 
74. Id. § 6103(a)(1). See also 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006) (granting the FCC authority to 
make telemarketing rules). 
75. 15 U.S.C. § 6102(a)(3)(A)(2006). 
76. Id. § 6102(a)(3)(B). 
77. Id. § 6102(a)(3)(C). 
78. See Angie A. Welborn, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31642, REGULATION OF THE 
TELEMARKETING INDUSTRY: STATE AND NATIONAL DO NOT-CALL REGISTRIES 2 
(July 8, 2003) (describing abusive telemarketing practices).  
79. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6107-6110 (2006). 
80. Id. § 6103(b). 
81. 16 C.F.R. § 310.1- 310.9 (2010) See ELECTRONIC INFORMATION PRIVACY CENTER, 
supra note 34 (stating that “it is important to note that the TSR does not apply to 
certain forms of telemarketing, including most business-to-business sales calls, 
telemarketing by banks, federal financial institutions, common carriers (phone 
companies and airlines), insurance companies, and non-profit organizations”). 
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more telephones and which involves more than one interstate telephone 
call.”82 As required by the 1994 act – and just like TCPA and the 
subsequent FCC rules – the TSR states that valid information about the 
identity of the caller, the caller’s affiliation with any company, and the 
purpose of the call must be disclosed at the beginning of the call.83 Among 
other prohibitions and guidelines, telemarketers are also required to keep 
extensive records of all calls, employees who make telemarketing calls, and 
any fake names used to maintain compliance with the law.84 The TSR also 
forbids “abandoned calls,” which occurs when a consumer answers a phone 
call and the telemarketer does not connect the call to a live sales 
representative within two seconds of the greeting.85 Just as with the FCC 
regulations, certain exceptions apply. For instance, telemarketers can still 
call people from whom they have obtained an express agreement to call 
that person, and they can also call people with whom they have an 
established business relationship.86  
The TSR also includes a type of “safe harbor” provision whereby a 
company can shield itself from liability by establishing and implementing 
written compliance procedures, training its employees under these 
procedures, and maintaining a list of persons who may not be called due to 
their request.87 Other than the additional prohibition of abusive 
telemarketing acts (such as threats or intimidation),88 the TSR closely 
mirrors the TCPA and the subsequent FCC rules. With so much similarity 
between the TSR, the TCPA, and FCC rules, it was not until a number of 
revisions by both the FTC and the FCC that the purpose of this dual 
regulatory and enforcement process became clear. 
E.  A Flurry of Revisions: FTC and FCC Telemarketing Rule Changes 
Play Catch-Up. 
While a period of relative rule-making calm followed the promulgation 
of the TSR, both the FTC and the FCC rapidly made rulemaking revisions 
to regulate telemarketing in the early 2000s.89 Although the FCC and the 
FTC both had the authority to establish a do-not-call registry since 1991 
 
82. 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(dd) (2010).  
83. Id. § 310.1-310.9. 
84. Id. § 310.4(b). 
85. Additional Report to Congress Pursuant to the Do Not Call Registry Fee 
Extension Act of 2007, FED. TRADE COMM’N 12 (2009). 
86. 16 C.F.R  § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(ii) (2010).  
87. Id. § 310.4(b). 
88. Id. § 310.2(dd) (noting that “threats, intimidation, or the use of profane or 
obscene language constitutes abusive conduct.”).  
89. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, 18 FCC RCD. 14014, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND 
REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 
1991 (2003) (stating that Commission reviewed the telemarketing rules and 
adopted modification and changes in the rules).  
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and 1994, respectively,90 the 2003 revisions represented the first time the 
agencies worked together to create a proactive national registry. The Do 
Not Call Implementation Act, passed on March 11, 2003, implemented a 
nationwide, online do-not-call list that combined the phone numbers on 
existing state do-not-call lists and created an easy clearinghouse for 
consumers who wanted to avoid telemarketing calls.91  
Both regulatory agencies recognized that company-specific lists were 
not sufficiently preventing telemarketing calls; a nationwide registry that 
combined existing, smaller do-not call lists and served as a “one-stop” 
solution to reduce telemarketing calls provided a more direct remedy. 
Administered by the FTC, the Do Not Call Registry was widely heralded in 
the media as the end of telemarketing calls and also proved popular with 
the public, with over 50 million numbers entered onto the list within the 
first few months.92 Because the TCPA only explicitly gave the FCC 
authority to create such a list and the TCFAPA did not give the same 
authority to the FTC, the FTC’s authority to enforce a do-not-call list was 
initially challenged.93 Despite the dual regulatory power of the FTC and 
FCC, the Do Not Call Implementation Act was a step to end 
inconsistencies. The Act requires annual reports from each agency about 
the progress of telemarketing regulation and enforcement,94 and mandates 
that any inconsistencies be resolved administratively by the agencies, or 
“Congress must address them legislatively.”95 
As of October 2003, it was illegal for telemarketers to call numbers 
listed on the registry.96 After the Do Not Call Implementation Act, the FTC 
and the FCC both made revisions to their existing telemarketing rules to 
reflect the impact of the Do Not Call Registry. The FTC’s 2002 revisions to 
the TSR also made it illegal to interfere with caller ID services although 
telemarketers can still use the name and number of a legitimate company.97  
Telemarketers must use a version of the National Do Not Call list no more 
 
90. See supra Part (II). 
91. Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6110 (2003).    
92. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 85, at 2. 
93. See Welborn, supra note 78, at 6-7 (stating that after the FTC issued amendments 
to the Telemarketing Sales Rule, “the Commission’s authority to promulgate 
regulations imposing fees on telemarketers for use of the do not call list was at 
issue.”).  
94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6110 (2006) (requiring that the FCC and FTC each submit a 
report to the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation of the Senate within 45 days after the promulgation 
of a FCC final rule).    
95. Id.    
96. See Welborn, supra note 78, at 8-9 (stating that “as of October, it will be illegal 
for telemarketers to call numbers listed on the registry). 
97. See Hatfield, supra note 24, at 830-31 (stating that the ANI “[i]dentifies which 
telephone account to charge for incoming phone calls). 
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than 31 days old to scrub their telemarketing lists.98 The FCC’s revisions 
also regulated predictive dialers, requiring that telemarketers abandon no 
more than three percent of calls when using these dialing tools.99  
Although the TCPA gave the FCC power to initiate rules regarding 
prerecorded voice messages in 1991,100 the 2003 revisions explicitly 
targeted prerecorded voice messages, recognizing that the majority of 
prerecorded calls offering “free” things (in an attempt to not be regarded as 
“explicitly commercial”) are “designed with the ultimate goal of soliciting 
consumers to buy products and services and are therefore prohibited 
without the prior express consent of the called party.”101 Like the FTC, the 
FCC’s 2003 revisions also included a requirement that telemarketers 
transmit correct caller identification information when available; caller ID 
blocking was prohibited.102 The exemption for the “established business 
relationship” was narrowed, limiting the relationship to at most eighteen 
months and requiring that the “established relationship” be of such a nature 
“to create an expectation on the part of the consumer that a particular 
company will call them.”103 Responding to a telemarketing call in some 
way (for example, by pressing a button) is not enough to establish a 
“business relationship.”104 The Telemarketing Relief Act of 2003 even 
 
98. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS 
IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, 18 FCC 
Rcd. at n. 37 (2003) (“comparing a do not call list to a company’s call list and 
eliminating from the call list the telephone numbers of consumers who have 
registered a desire not to be called.”). 
99. Id. at 14017. Although telemarketers use predictive dialers in an attempt to 
minimize the amount of downtime both callers and consumers have during a call, 
the call often results in a predicate dialer greeting some callers, but not others, 
leaving some calls silent.  
100. Id. at 14116 (This revision may have been unnecessary and duplicative, 
considering the FCC statement regarding the TCPA: “we affirm that under the 
TCPA, it is unlawful to make any call using an automatic telephone dialing 
system or an artificial or prerecorded message to any wireless telephone 
number”). See also 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1) (stating that “it shall be unlawful for 
any person within the United States . . . to make any call (other than a call made 
for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called 
party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded 
voice”).  
101. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS 
IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, 18 FCC 
Rcd. at 14097 (2003). 
102. Id. at 14017 (stating that “the new rules will also require all companied 
conducting telemarketing to transmit caller identification (caller ID) information, 
when available, and prohibits them from blocking such information.”).   
103. Id. at 14081. 
104. Id. (stating that “an inquiry regarding a business’s hours or location would not 
establish the necessary relationship as defined in Commission rules.”).  
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stated that the FCC must establish “substantially similar” regulations to the 
TSR within 90 days of the act.105  
It took time before both regulatory structures were “substantially 
similar.” However, recognizing that “marketplace changes warrant 
modifications to our existing rules,”106 the FCC did not stop revising its 
telemarketing regulations with the implementation of the Do Not Call 
Registry. The FCC continued to add to and revise its rules, subsequently 
amending its telemarketing regulations in 2004 by amending the National 
Do Not Call Registry safe harbor rules,107 in 2008 by requiring 
telemarketers to honor do-not-call list registrations indefinitely,108 and 2012 
by adopting five specific customer protections.109 Although the FCC wrote 
in 2003, “[w]e intend to develop a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
FTC in the near future outlining the respective federal responsibilities 
under the national do-not-call rules,”110 the FCC and FTC’s constant 
revisions throughout the 2000s are duplicative and confusing. The FTC 
revised its own TSR twice in 2008 (first, banning prerecorded messages 
unless written consent is given and limiting call abandonment to 3%)111 and 
second (setting maximum and minimum permanent fees for access to the 
registry).112  The Do Not Call Improvement Act in part initiated these 
 
105. Telemarketing Relief Act, H.R. 526, 108th Cong. (2003) (requiring that “not later 
than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the agencies identified in 
subsection (b) shall issue rules that are substantially similar to the Telemarketing 
Sales Rule promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission.”). 
106. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS 
IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, 18 FCC 
Rcd. at 14017 (2003). 
107. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS 
IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, 19 FCC 
Rcd. at 19215 (2004) (requiring that the existing safe harbor rules for 
telemarketers be amended “to require such telemarketers to access the do-not-call 
list no more than 31 days prior to making a telemarketing call”).  
108. Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Rules Amended to Require 
Telemarketers to Honor Do-Not-Call List Registrations Indefinitely (June 17, 
2008), http://www.fcc.gov/tools/headlines-archive/2008 (stating that the rules 
requiring telemarketers to honor Do-Not-Call registry registrations indefinitely). 
109. Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Adopts Rules to Strengthen 
Consumer Protections Against Unwanted Telemarketing “Robocalls” to Wireline 
and Wireless Phones (Feb. 15, 2012), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-312493A1.pdf. 
110. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CG DOCKET NO. 02-278, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND 
REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 
1991, at 46 (2003). 
111. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Issues Final Telemarketing Sales Rule 
Amendments Regarding Prerecorded Calls (Aug. 19, 2008), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/08/tsr.shtm). 
112. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.8 (2006) (“The annual fee, which 
must be paid by any person prior to obtaining access to the National Do Not Call 
Registry, is $62 per area code of data accessed, up to a maximum of $17,050.”). 
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changes. Signed in early 2008, the legislation focused on necessary 
changes regarding the FTC’s administration of the Do Not Call list.113  
While the FTC’s revisions were instigated by acts of Congress,114 the FCC 
revisions seemed to occur without a discernible pattern. 
Initially, some changes in the FTC and FCC regulations seemed to 
serve the interests of both consumers and telemarketers; an FTC report, as 
required by the Do Not Call Implementation Act, reported high 
effectiveness of Do Not Call outreach focusing on seniors and immigrants, 
and “consumers who have joined the registry report dramatic reductions in 
unwanted marketing calls.”115 The FTC’s 2008 changes explicitly forbade 
prerecorded calls; 116 however, these prerecorded calls were already 
forbidden by the FCC’s 2003 revisions to its telemarketing regulations117 
and the TCPA.118  Despite the FCC’s regulation of predictive dialers in 
2003, the FTC’s 2009 report acknowledged that abandoned calls were still 
on the rise.119   
This “catch-up game” of regulations did not end in 2008. While the 
FTC’s 2008 revisions required prior express written consent from a 
consumer in order for a telemarketer to have permission to make a legal 
call, the FCC did not make similar revisions until 2012.120 Among other 
provisions, these revisions require telemarketers to obtain written consent 
from the customer (even if it is only on an online form) and provide 
customers with an automated method to opt out of future calls for the 
company itself (even if it is at the end of the call).  The FTC’s 2008 
revisions had already required an interactive opt-out procedure for 
consumers to add their numbers to the Do Not Call list and report the 
violation using push buttons during the call.121  The 2012 FCC rules also 
 
113. See generally 15 U.S.C.A. § 6101 (West 2014) (discussing the reasoning for 
Congressional action regarding the regulation of telemarketing). 
114. Telemarketing Relief Act of 2003, H.R. 52, 108th Cong. (2003); Do-Not-Call 
Improvement Act of 2007, H.R. 3541, 110th Cong. (2008). 
115. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 85, at 1. 
116. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS 
IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, 27 FCC 
Rcd. at 1830-31 (2012) (discussing the previously enacted requirements for 
prerecorded messages). 
117. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS 
IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, 18 FCC 
Rcd. at 1404 (2003). 
118. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(2006). 
119. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 85, at 13-14. 
120. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS 
IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, 27 FCC 
Rcd. at 1830 (2012) (implementing reactively many of the same provisions the 
FTC had implemented years earlier; the regulations did not go into effect until 
early 2013). 
121. See Do-Not-Call Improvement Act of 2007, H.R. 3541, 110th Cong. (2008).  
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eliminated the “established business relationship”122 exception that allowed 
companies to call customers for 18 months after a purchase.123  While 
companies may still call consumers from whom they have received express 
written consent, the element of consent must be “clear and conspicuous 
disclosure” where the customer agrees unambiguously to receive calls.124  
The consent must be obtained in a manner that does not require the 
agreement be executed as a condition of a purchase decision.125 Consent is 
not necessarily difficult to obtain, however; the FTC has ruled that the E-
sign Act, where consent may be obtained through telephone buttons, e-
signatures on the internet, or other electronic means, will satisfy the 
“express consent” requirement.126  
Coming four years after the FTC’s most relevant changes in 
telemarketing regulation, the FCC’s 2012 revisions were particularly 
reactive; the FCC even wrote that it was evident that rulemaking changes 
were needed due to “ongoing consumer frustration reflected in our 
complaint data and the positive consumer response to the FTC’s 
proceedings.”127 As with other revisions by the FTC and FCC, these were 
hailed as a permanent solution to stop robocalls in the news media. One 
reporter writes, “those aggravating automated telemarketing calls will be 
interrupting your dinner a lot less often.”128 While the multiple revisions to 
the FTC and FCC telemarketing rules certainly aim to “maximize 
 
122. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 85, at 12 (stating that the established business 
relationship exemption was often perceived as inconsistent by members of the 
public, because “the consumers are unaware of these exceptions or are not aware 
that they have a relationship with the seller that falls within one of these 
exceptions.”).  
123. Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Adopts Rules to Strengthen 
Consumer Protections Against Unwanted Telemarketing “Robocalls” to Wireline 
and Wireless Phones (Feb. 15, 2012), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-312493A1.pdf 
(“Eliminating the ‘established business relationship’ exemption to the 
requirement that telemarketing robocalls to residential wireline phones occur only 
with prior express consent from the consumer.”). 
124. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS 
IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, 27 FCC 
Rcd. at 1830 (2012). 
125. Id. (“In addition, the written agreement must be obtained without requiring, 
directly or indirectly, that the agreement be executed as a condition of purchasing 
any good or service.”). 
126. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS 
IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, 27 FCC 
Rcd. at 1830 (2012); 15 U.S.C. 7006(4) (2006). 
127. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS 
IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, 27 FCC 
Rcd. at 1830 (2012). 
128. Andrea Chang, New FCC Rules Curb Automated Telemarketing Calls, L.A. 
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2012), http://articles/latimes.com/2012/feb/15/business/la-fi-
robcalling-20120216. 
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consistency,” consistency has never fully been evident in telemarketing 
rulemaking. 
III. COMMERCIAL SPEECH ISSUES: DOES “RACHEL” HAVE FIRST 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS? 
Although inconsistent rulemaking provisions from the FTC and FCC 
may distract from the purpose of telemarketing regulation, its ultimate aim 
is to balance the right of the telemarketer’s freedom to make calls (as a 
form of speech) against the consumer’s right to remain free from unwanted 
intrusions in the home. Many consumers who hear “Rachel” on the other 
end of the line may not realize the mutterings of this “robots” are protected 
by the First Amendment, but the constitutionality of regulations concerning 
this type of robot call has been challenged in court on this exact basis.129 
Telemarketing regulations have been subject to a number of First 
Amendment challenges over the years and have ultimately remained 
protected as “consistent with the First Amendment rights of commercial 
speakers,”130 but any analysis of potential telemarketing regulations 
requires an evaluation of the interests at stake.  
A. Telemarketing as Commercial Speech in the Home 
While the TCPA exempts calls that are not explicitly commercial,131 
many telemarketing calls – while not an outright solicitation for a product – 
are an attempt to propose a commercial transaction. Commercial speech is 
defined narrowly as speech that does “no more than propose a commercial 
transaction. . . [and are]. . . [r]emoved from any ‘exposition of ideas.’”132 
Robocalls fit this definition. Commercial speech also encompasses 
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its 
audience.”133 Robocalls that initially offer a reduction in credit card interest 
rates or a review of a mortgage might not solely relate to “the economic 
interests of the speaker and the audience.”134 Most robocalls aim to 
motivate the listener in some economic respect – either through gaining 
credit card information or defrauding the customer in some other way.135 
 
129. See, e.g., Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 358 F.3d 
1228, 1250 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that “the do-not-call list is a valid 
commercial speech regulation under Central Hudson.”). 
130. Id. at 1228. 
131. See supra Part II(I). 
132. Stephen M. Worth, Note, “Do Not Call” Laws and the First Amendment: Testing 
the Limits of Commercial Free Speech Protection, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. 
L. 467, 482 (2003) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447 (1978) 
(anticipating legal challenges to the National Do Not Call Registry). 
133. Id.  
134. Supra Part I(II). 
135. See INFORMATION PRIVACY CENTER, supra note 34 (discussing privacy, civil 
rights, and constitutional issues regarding telemarketing).   
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Determining what qualifies as commercial speech is based simply on “the 
‘common-sense’ distinction between speech proposing a commercial 
transaction . . . and other varieties of speech.”136 Because the speaker has an 
economic interest in the matter, and there are often no other purposes to the 
call beyond simple advertising, most robocalls qualify as commercial 
speech. 137 
Commercial speech is entitled to protection of the First Amendment – 
although less than non-commercial speech.138 If robocalls are defined as 
“commercial speech,” they are limited by reasonable restrictions;139 
however, the forum in which the commercial speech is given special 
consideration. 140 Phone lines in the private home are “a device for private 
communication,” and are therefore not a public forum.141 Robocalls made 
to a home phone line are particularly intrusive because the recipient cannot 
simply tell the caller to go away; the caller, rather than the recipient, elects 
the time and manner that the message arrives.142  As much as the robocaller 
may have the right to express a statement about a commercial product, a 
consumer must have the right to “have peace and quiet and tranquility in 
their home.”143  
The Supreme Court has recognized the sanctity of the home numerous 
times: “citizens in the privacy of their homes should be able to exercise a 
high degree of control over the communication to which they are 
subjected.”144 Likewise, “the government has an interest in upholding the 
 
136. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978) (discussing first 
amendment protection afforded to commercial speech).  See also Zauderer v. 
Office of Disc. Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (discussing protection of 
advertisers’ commercial rights). 
137. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp, 463 U.S. 60, 80 (1983) (ruling that 
mailing of unsolicited contraceptive advertisements is commercial speech). 
138. See Zauderer v. Office of Disc. Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (discussing 
protection of advertiser’s commercial rights). 
139. See infra text accompanying note 151. 
140. See Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1552 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding 
constitutionality of Minnesota’s Automatic Dialing-Announcing Device law); see 
also Miller, supra note 49, at 229 (discussing the controversial nature of 
automated robotic calls and their regulation). 
141. Miller, supra note 49, at 229 (2009) (discussing controversial nature of automated 
robotic calls and their regulation). 
142. See id. at 241 (2009) (citing Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1554-55 
(8th Cir. 1995)). 
143. See id. at 240 (quoting Indiana Supreme Court Justice Dixon) (discussing 
possible political impact on upcoming Indiana Supreme Court ruling regarding 
automated political robocalls). 
144. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (ruling that a recipient of 
postal mail has unreviewable discretion in deciding whether or not to receive 
future content from a particular sender, and that the sender does not have a 
constitutional right to mail unwanted material).  See also Nelson, supra note 50 
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rights of residents in their homes.”145 Because telemarketing is uniquely 
intrusive and many other forms of non-direct advertising are available, 
some courts have found that telemarketing should be subject to uniquely 
restrictive regulation.146  Aural communication, made through the personal 
home phone line, is especially intrusive because it is “extremely difficult to 
ignore and therefore more intrusive than visual communication.”147  Even 
though some skeptics have hesitated to call telemarketing a “serious 
intrusion”148 on privacy, the federal government has justified regulation 
based solely on complaints and outrage by consumers.149  
B. Under-Inclusive Regulations for an Overly Intrusive Device: 
Reasonable Restrictions Held Constitutional 
Although laws regulating commercial speech have consistently been 
challenged, “[t]he Supreme Court has consistently upheld the 
constitutionality of “underinclusive” regulations.”150 Most telemarketing 
 
(discussing the Do-Not-Call-Implementation-Act re-allocation of power between 
consumers and telemarketers). 
145. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CG DOCKET NO. 02-278, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND 
REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 
1991, at 41 (June 26, 2003) (reviewing and revising the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act by establishing; in conjunction with the Federal Trade 
Commission, a national do-not-call registry for customers wishing to avoid 
telemarketing calls); see also Rowan v. U.S. Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 737 
(1970) (ruling that a recipient of postal mail has unreviewable discretion in 
deciding whether or not to receive future content from a particular sender, and 
that the sender does not have a constitutional right to mail unwanted material), 
but see Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (ruling that a law 
prohibiting distribution of leaflets advertising a Jehovah’s Witness religious 
meeting violates a Jehovah Witness’ First Amendment rights). 
146. Telemarketing and door-to-door solicitation have been distinguished from other 
forms of marketing because of the immediate attention they require. See Miller, 
supra note 49, at 241 (discussing the controversial nature of automated robotic 
calls and their regulation). 
147. Nelson, supra note 50, at 71 (discussing the Do-Not-Call-Implementation-Act re-
allocation of power between consumers and telemarketers). 
148. Worth, supra note 132, at 491 (writing that “it is a bit of a stretch to characterize 
these interruptions as ‘serious intrusions’ since the solicitations are short and can 
easily be ended by the consumer at any time by merely hanging up the phone”). 
149. Robert McDowell, Statement Regarding Rules and Regulations Implementing the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (Feb. 15, 2012), 
http://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-strengthens-consumer-protections-against-
telemarketing-robocalls-0) (last viewed Feb. 11, 2014) (stating “sometimes it 
seems like there’s no escape. The minute you sit down at the family dinner table 
or settle in to watch your favorite basketball team, the phone rings.”). See also 
Mignon Clyburn, Statement Regarding Rules and Regulations Implementing the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (Feb. 15, 2012), 
http://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-strengthens-consumer-protections-against-
telemarketing-robocalls-0 (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) (stating that the revisions 
are “yet another victory for consumers”). 
150. Nelson, supra note 50, at 71. 
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regulations fall within this category; those short of a ban are upheld 
because the regulations “only prevent dissemination to the unwilling.”151 
Non-content based bans of truthful, non-misleading messages have been 
upheld:152 “We have often noted that restrictions of this kind are valid 
provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information.”153 The government may place 
reasonable time and manner restrictions on content neutral speech;154 for 
example, reasonable-timing restrictions, such as the restrictions on when a 
telemarketer can call, such as between 9 A.M. and 8 P.M are constitutional. 
Telemarketers challenging the TCPA in the early 1990s claimed the statute 
was not content neutral—saying it “regulated speech based on substance 
rather than form”—but these challenges were overturned.155   
However, robocalls and fraudulent telemarketing messages may not 
always be truthful, and these types of calls are often harder to track.156 
When evaluating any new potential regulation, the interests of the parties at 
 
151. See id. (discussing “consumer specific restrictions on point-to-point media”); 
Rowan v. U.S. Post Office, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (ruling that a recipient of postal 
mail has unreviewable discretion in deciding whether or not to receive future 
content from a particular sender, and that the sender does not have a 
constitutional right to mail unwanted material).  
152. See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428 (1993) (ruling that 
a ban on distribution of commercial material through news racks is a violation of 
the first amendment). See also 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502 
(1996) (ruling that a complete ban on advertising alcohol prices is a violation of 
the first amendment).  
153. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) 
(ruling that National Park Service regulation banning sleeping in national parks is 
not a First Amendment violation, even in light of an awareness group’s permit for 
a seven day protest); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 
U.S. 789 (1984) (upholding content neutral and impartially administered city law 
banning signs on public land because the city’s interests were substantial enough 
to justify it); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (ruling that ban on 
carrying signs, banners, or devices on public sidewalks surrounding the Supreme 
Court building is unconstitutional); Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (ruling that a states cannot 
limit pharmacists from providing information about prescription drug prices); 
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 430 (1993) (ruling that a 
ban on distribution of commercial material through news racks is a violation of 
the First Amendment). 
154. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (stating that 
“[e]xpression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to 
reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.”). 
155. See Joseph R. Cox, Telemarketing, The First Amendment, and Privacy: 
Expanding Telemarketing Regulations Without Violating the Constitution, 17 
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 403, 406-07 (1995) (stating that “the statute was not 
a proper time, place, or manner restriction.”). 
156. Henning Schulzrinne, supra note 24. 
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stake must be weighed in order to evaluate the best solution.157 A ban on 
fraudulent telemarketing calls—or at the very least “deceptive” types of 
calls—may have a genuine justification that would serve millions of 
frustrated consumers. However, the Supreme Court has stated “protection 
available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of 
the expression and of the governmental interests served by its 
regulation.”158  Indeed, “while certain regulations short of an outright ban 
would certainly be unconstitutional, some regulation of robocalls is 
permissible under the First Amendment.”159 Simply because alternatives for 
marketing—such as mass mailings or email—are available and 
constitutional, however, does not mean that they are ideal: “simple 
economics tells us that these firms have found that they can be most 
profitable if they disseminate their messages [through telemarketing].”160 
Although “more people may be more easily and cheaply reached . . . [this] 
is not enough to call forth constitutional protection of what those charged 
with public welfare reasonably think is a nuisance when easy means of 
publicity are open.”161 While a general prohibition on robocalls might be 
unwise,162 a careful analysis of the First Amendment interests at stake in 
any additional telemarketing regulation is warranted.163  
The Supreme Court first gave protection to commercial speech in 
Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, holding 
that pharmacists did have a right to advertise the prices of their drugs to 
consumers.164 Subsequent cases followed this line of reasoning until 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of 
New York, which introduced a more concrete test that set forth four 
considerations for valid commercial speech: 
 
157. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (weighing the right of the 
individual householder to make decisions about listening to solicitors, or whether 
the community should make the decisions for or against solicitors).  
158. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 
(1980) (discussing the constitutional protection given to commercial speech). 
159. Miller, supra note 49, at 245 (discussing regulations less strict than an outright 
ban). 
160. Worth, supra note 132, at 476 (stating that “telemarketers use telephonic 
communication for a reason.”). 
161. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949) (discussing enforcing freedom of 
speech at the cost of disregarding the rights of others). 
162. See Hynes v. Mayor, 425 U.S. 610, 623 (1976) (Brennan, J. dissenting) (stating 
laws ‘must encounter substantial First Amendment barriers” and should be 
scrutinized). 
163. Michael E. Shannon, Note, Combatting Unsolicited Sales Calls: The “Do-Not-
Call” Approach to Solving the Telemarketing Problem, 27 J. LEGIS. 381, 383 
(2001) (stating “[t]he First Amendment interests of the caller must be weighed 
against the privacy interests of the consumer.”). 
164. Va. Pharm. Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) 
(holding that the government could not suppress truthful information from being 
lawfully advertised). 
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If the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful 
activity. . . [t]he State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by 
restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory technique 
must be in proportion to that interest. The limitations on expression must 
be designed carefully to achieve the state’s goal . . . First, the restriction 
must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be 
sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the 
governments purpose. Second, if the governmental interest could be served 
as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive 
restrictions cannot survive.165   
1. Non-misleading commercial speech, not related to unlawful 
activity 
The Supreme Court stated in Central Hudson that “[t]he First 
Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the informational 
function of advertising.” Although there is no strong constitutional basis 
for forbidding messages that are inaccurate, the “government may ban 
forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform 
it.”166 All robocalls made by prerecorded dialers may not be explicitly 
unlawful, but some calls (like those offering reduced credit card rates or 
special insurance offers), may mislead consumers. On these grounds a 
more specific ban or additional regulation of robocalls may be justified.  
2. Substantial governmental interest in regulation 
The second prong in the Central Hudson test, which addresses whether 
the government has a substantial interest in the regulation at stake, further 
supports increased regulation. In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., the Supreme 
Court found that disclosure of more information, rather than less, served 
both the government and consumer interests at stake in the regulation of 
alcohol.167 Because the government has a substantial interest in protecting 
the health and safety of its citizens, disclosure of more information about 
 
165. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
166. Id. (stating “there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of 
commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful 
activity”). See also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 464-65 (1978) 
(stating “the justifications for prohibiting truthful . . . [advertising] are insufficient 
to override . . . the First and Fourteenth Amendments, in assuring the free flow of 
commercial information.”); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 
413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) (“On the contrary, we reaffirm unequivocally the 
protection afforded to editorial judgment and to the free expression of views on 
these and other issues, however controversial.”). 
167. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 484 (1995) (“In the 
Government’s view, restricting disclosure of information regarding a particular 
product characteristic will decrease the extent to which consumers will select the 
product on the basis of that characteristic.”). 
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the content of the beer was warranted.168 Likewise, since the government 
has an interest in protecting its citizens from fraud—while also protecting 
small businesses—stricter robocalling regulation could protect the 
individuals receiving the calls as well as restore the public’s trust in 
legitimate small businesses that may be making genuine sales calls.169   
3. Directly advances the governmental interest 
The third element in the Central Hudson test addresses whether the 
regulation is “narrowly tailored” to achieve a government interest. This 
element does not directly support more regulation as “[t]he State cannot 
regulate speech that poses no danger to the asserted state interest.”170 
Arguably, fraudulent telemarketing calls pose no direct danger to state 
interests, and a complete ban on robocalls would only interfere with the 
government’s interests.171 Telemarketing calls are a valuable tool for 
companies to reach consumers easily and cheaply; a more explicit ban 
would not clearly advance the interest of the government.172 Here, the 
proactive Do Not Call registry, a simple mechanism for registry and 
reporting, is a remedy more narrowly tailored toward protecting both the 
interests of the government and the businesses at stake in the matter. 173   
4. Not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest 
Finally, regulation must not be more extensive than necessary to serve 
the governmental interest at stake. In Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 
the Supreme Court held that regulations must not burden more speech than 
is necessary to further the government interest they promote.174 This 
element does not support broad-based bans. In Central Hudson, for 
 
168. Id. at 488 (“While the laws governing labeling prohibit the disclosure of alcohol 
content unless required by state law, federal regulations apply a contrary policy to 
beer advertising.”). 
169. See Statement of Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Rules 
and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 
(Feb. 15, 2012) (“At the same time that we help consumers avoid unwanted 
robocalls, we do so in a manner that is minimally burdensome to businesses, 
including small businesses.”). 
170. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 565 (stating “the First Amendment 
mandates that speech restrictions be ‘narrowly drawn.). 
171. i.e., in notifying residents about emergency situations. 
172. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 15 U.S. 618 (1995) (discussing the balance between 
the legislature’s ends and the means used to reach them). 
173. Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 23 F.C.C.R. § 559 
(2003).  
174. Turner Broad. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 520 U.S. 180, 213-14 (1997) (stating 
“the Government may employ the means of its choosing” as long as the 
regulation upholds a substantial governmental interest and only goes as far as is 
necessary to promote that interest). 
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example, the Court found that as important as the energy-conservation 
rationale is, it cannot justify suppressing information.175  
Although all of these interests might be fulfilled through telemarketing 
regulation, the government might be justified in offering more extensive 
telemarketing regulation based on the government’s interest in protecting 
the public from “commercial harms.”176 Here, while some telemarketing 
calls are fraudulent, other telemarketing calls serve a valuable purpose of 
informing customers about valuable deals and promotions. As the 
government still has an interest in promoting business, a complete ban on 
robocalling would likely be deemed more extensive than necessary to serve 
governmental purposes. Although irate recipients of constant robocalls may 
think otherwise, “a statute cannot foreclose an entire medium of 
expression.”177  
IV. CONSIDERATION OF A SAMPLING OF PROPOSED REMEDIES TO 
REDUCE ROBOCALLS 
Absent a complete ban on robocalls, any effective remedy to reduce 
fraudulent robocalls must bridge both the technical and legal gaps in the 
market. Although inconsistent regulation may have caused consumers and 
telemarketers to think otherwise, certain calls made through the use of 
prerecorded voice messages have been illegal for decades.178  But 
consumers still receive millions of these calls a year despite multiple forms 
of regulation and growing enforcement efforts.179 One proposed solution 
illustrates this paradox: absent a complete ban, regulation that treats the Do 
Not Call Registry as a digital “no solicitation” sign has also been proposed; 
this solution would make it impossible to call a telephone number on the 
Do Not Call Registry.180 While not altogether practical since this number 
would still need to receive legitimate robocalls, this suggestion impedes 
legitimate telemarketer access to numbers on the Do Not Call Registry and 
 
175. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 570 (“But the energy conservation 
rationale, as important as it is, cannot justify suppressing information about 
electric devices or services that would cause no net increase in total energy use.”). 
176. 44 Liquormart v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (explaining why commercial 
speech can be subject to more regulation than noncommercial speech); see also 
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993) (stating 
“preventing commercial harms by regulating the information distributed . . . is, of 
course, the typical reason why commercial speech can be subject to greater 
governmental regulation than noncommercial speech.”). 
177. Miller, supra note 49, at 244; City of Ladue v. Gileo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994). 
178. See supra Part II(I).  
179. See supra text accompanying note 2 (One robocall firm bragged of calling 10% to 
20% of the American population daily). 
180. Cox, supra note 156, at 424 (stating “Telemarketing should be banned until the 
technology is available to put a “no solicitation” sign on your phone number as 
well.”) 
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ignores the realities of direct marketing.181 While it may reduce the number 
of solicitations made, even physical “no solicitation” signs do not prevent 
canvassers from walking up to a door, thus it is unclear that a digital 
version would have any true impact on solicitations.  
The ideal telemarketing solution must also capitalize on relative 
societal norms, taking into account expected consumer and telemarketer 
behavior. While an “opt-in” system would be ideal, it would essentially 
make the telemarketing system defunct.182 As consumers are not 
accustomed to “opting-in” to ideas that may be perceived as harmful or 
annoying; the average consumer is far more likely to “opt-out” of such a 
scheme. Because “consumers are accustomed to being solicited at home 
and virtually everywhere else,”183 opting in to telemarketing calls would 
not prevent any more robocalls than the Do Not Call Registry already does. 
Additionally, with the addition of the “express written consent” element of 
the 2008 FTC revisions and 2012 FCC revisions, an opt-in solution 
essentially already exists;184 consumers who give their express written 
consent can receive telemarketing calls from that company. This “consent” 
can also be manipulated in many ways, however; “express written consent” 
can be obtained through obtained by telemarketers through an online form, 
credit card signature, or a “terms” agreement on a website.185 Although an 
“opt-in” solution may reduce some telemarketing calls, the suggestion is 
far from ideal. This proposed solution is most likely to impede free speech 
by telemarketers: “when limitations on speech are requested or mandated 
by individual listeners rather than the government, the First Amendment 
protection afforded to the speaker is less.”186 
Another suggested solution would quite literally “capitalize” on 
societal norms: a “pay-me-to listen” solution, such as that advocated by 
New York Times columnist James B. Rule, “would allow consumers to put 
a price tag on their time spent listening to telemarketing calls.”187  This 
“low tech” solution would require telephone providers to offer consumers 
 
181. Q&A For Telemarketers & Sellers About DNC Provisions in TSR, BUREAU OF 
CONSUMER PROTECTION BUSINESS CENTER, 
http://www.business.ftc.gov/documents/alt129-qa-telemarketers-sellers-about-
dnc-provisions-tsr (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
182. See Nelson, supra note 50, at 76 (noting that an opt-in proposal would remedy the 
current situation in which all consumers are vulnerable to calls unless they have 
affirmatively acted otherwise). 
183. Id. 
184. See Telemarketers and Robocalls, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, 
http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/telemarketing (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) 
(“most recently, in 2012, the FCC revised its TCPA rules to require telemarketers 
to obtain prior express written consent from consumers before robocalling them.” 
).  
185. Supra text accompanying note 124.  
186. Worth, supra note 132, at 476. 
187. Nelson, supra note 50, at 76. 
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the option of only accepting “bonded” calls, or calls that had already been 
screened as a valid telemarketing call.188 If the recipient of the call 
designates the call a nuisance, then the telemarketer would then be billed 
for the call.189 Here, the burden of compliance and expense is placed almost 
entirely on the telemarketer, who would have to demonstrate “willingness 
and ability to compensate the recipient – should the latter designate the call 
a nuisance” before placing any telemarketing calls.190 Although Rule 
suggested that this “would require only modest alteration[s] of existing 
technology,” he has not “vetted the scheme with a technical expert.”191 
Technical considerations aside, the scheme likely would not pass 
constitutional muster; paying the consumer to listen to telemarketing calls 
would make telemarketing cost-prohibitive for small and fledgling 
businesses. This likely impermissibly constrains commercial speech. 
Although some consumers may agree to participate in this suggested 
scheme as a potential source of income, it is more likely that few 
consumers would agree to participate. In order to receive the suggested 
compensation for listening to “nuisance” telemarketing calls, the consumer 
must agree to listen to the nuisance – a counterintuitive process.192 
Clearly, since consumers do not want to listen to robocalls and they 
value privacy within their home, the ideal remedy to reduce robocalls 
would weigh the value of this privacy against the utility of the solution. 
One researcher used data from the Do Not Call Registry in an attempt to 
monetize the exact privacy interest at stake, measuring what value a 
telemarketer must provide in order to convince a consumer not to join the 
Do Not Call Registry.193  This research found that “if the privacy cost is 
$8.25 per year (per consumer), then the direct marketing industry must 
increase the expected consumer surplus to exceed $8.25 a year in order to 
persuade consumers to accept telemarketing and remove themselves from 
the do not call registry.”194 Unless enough telemarketers offer legitimate, 
non-fraudulent business considerations, “each telemarketer will provide too 
 
188. James B. Rule, Op-Ed., Call Me, Pay Fee, N. Y. TIMES, June 21, 2012, at A25. 
This proposal was also submitted to the FTC Robocall Challenge. 
189. Id. (stating that “institutional callers that now offend thousands to obtain a 
positive response from a tiny majority would be obliged to weigh the effects of 
their entreaties on all those whose attendance they commandeer.”). 
190. Id. 
191. Jeffries, supra note 9. 
192. Nelson, supra note 50, at 77 (noting that although this proposal would allow only 
those telemarketers willing to pay the consumer’s price to speak to them, it is 
unlikely to be successful as there is little indication of consumers being interested 
in participation). 
193. Ivan P.L. Png, On the Value of Privacy from Telemarketing: Evidence from the 
‘Do Not Call’ Registry 3 (2007) (unpublished manuscript) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1000533) (using econometric 
methods to estimate the value of state and federal do not call registries). 
194. Id. 
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little benefit to consumers, and hence, the number of consumers who 
accept telemarketing will fall short of the social optimum.”195 Regardless of 
the $8.25 in “privacy costs,” however, the ultimate interests at stake are 
much harder to calculate as “there is the . . . cost of having one’s personal 
space invaded by a robocaller that one never wished to summon.196  
When the FTC announced its “Robocall Challenge” on October 18, 
2012, the FTC stepped outside of its rulemaking power to advocate for a 
“crowd-sourced” solution to robocalling.197 Offering $50,000 for a 
technical solution to reduce robocalls, the Robocall Summit expressed the 
first perspective from an agency that a solution to end robocalling must be 
a combination of technical, legal, and practical remedies. The FTC is 
certainly not the first agency to advocate for a crowd-sourced solution to a 
public policy problem and offer money for the solution;198 however, many 
crowd-sourced solutions often fall flat.199 With the challenge, the FTC 
recognizes the ways in which the Do Not Call Registry is limited: “The 
companies that use this technology don’t bother to screen for numbers on 
the Do Not Call Registry. If the company doesn’t care about obeying the 
law, you can be sure they’re trying to scam you.”200 At the summit, the 
FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection Director David Vladeck stated, “we 
think this will be an effective approach in the case of robocalls because the 
winner of our challenge will become a national hero.”201 A “national hero” 
is certainly what is needed: because of the call spoofing, inefficient 
tracking mechanisms, and the sheer number of robocalls, the FTC has 
consistently had trouble tracking these callers.202 An ideal solution would 
require telephone providers and government regulators to work together. 
However, “[t]he legacy infrastructure of the public switch telephone 
 
195. Id. at 7 (concluding, ultimately, that “[e]ach telemarketer will provide too little 
benefit to consumers, and hence, the number of consumers who accept 
telemarketing will fall short of the social optimum.”). 
196. Randall Stross, Robocalls Instigate a Cellphone Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 
2011, at BU3.  
197. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Challenges Innovators to Do Battle with 
Robocallers (Oct. 18, 2012).  
198. Miller, supra note 37 (stating that the government currently has 237 open public 
challenges, as of January 23, 2013). 
199. Jeffries, supra note 9 (giving the example of a Netflix challenge that encouraged 
consumers to create an ideal algorithm to create the video suggestions for 
consumers).  
200. Robocalls, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 2012), 
http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0259-robocalls (discussing how technology 
allows companies to make thousands of automated calls per minute at negligible 
costs, which explains the spike in robocalls). 
201. Sperry, supra note 21 (describing the FTC Robocall Challenge).  
202. See Schulzrinne, supra note 24 (explaining how automation has been on the side 
of companies that perpetrate robocalls, and how the means currently employed by 
law enforcement are not adequate to match what robocallers use). 
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network, and the fact that carriers and government must coordinate, make” 
cooperation extremely difficult.203 But with the Robocall Challenge, a 
solution that helps telephone service providers, telemarketers, and the 
government work together to reduce robocalls, such coordination may be 
successful.  
In addition to any technical solution, an ideal remedy to reduce 
robocalls would also include streamlined enforcement methods. The 
enforcement methods the FTC currently employs are slow and 
cumbersome. While robocall telemarketers may be international operations 
with automated computer and numbering systems in multiple locations,204 
the FTC must fax its efforts to enforce robocall regulations via subpoenas 
and injunctions one document at a time, slowly moving through 
complicated manual trace back methods.205 Unlike email spam enforcement 
efforts - which could possibly be traced back to one IP address or 
encrypted metadata – it is much harder to track spoofed phone numbers.206 
The FTC has brought over 100 enforcement actions against telemarketing 
in the ten years since the Do Not Call Registry went into effect,207 but many 
more enforcement actions could come to fruition if the FTC has an efficient 
method to track fraudulent numbers. These cases have resulted in $6.9 
million in penalties,208 but this number pales in comparison to the 3.84 
million robocall complaints, 2.26 million of which included recorded 
messages.209 Although an “opt-in” or “pay me to listen” solution is unlikely 
to stand up to constitutional challenges or technical realities, the FTC’s 
Robocall Challenge, paired with additional regulation, has potential. 
  
V.     PROPOSED REMEDIES TO REDUCE ROBOCALLS AND 
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Inconsistent and duplicative regulations, First Amendment 
considerations, slow methods of enforcement, and the complicated nature 
of proposed solutions prove that any remedy to reduce robocalls must 
include a multi-layered combination of legal and technical remedies in 
order to stop the constant invasion of “Rachel” and “Ann” into America’s 
 
203. Jeffries, supra note 9 (arguing that technology gives robocallers a net advantage 
over law enforcement). http://www.theverge.com/2013/1/28/3924544/who-can-
stop-robocalls-ftcs-attempt-to-crowdsource-a-solution-falls 
204. Supra Part I. 
205. See Schulzrinne, supra note 24 (referring to the laborious and often inefficient 
process law enforcement employs when trying to trace back robocalls). 
206. Id. (explaining why, despite the ease with which we can block email spam today, 
applying similar processes to phone calls is very difficult or even impossible). 
207. Jeffries, supra note 9 (discussing why the Robocall Challenge was unsuccessful 
in providing the FTC with a solution to stop robocalls). 
208. Id. 
209. Miller, supra note 37 (discussing the Robocall Challenge).  
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homes. At best, theses remedies would reflect the purpose of the TCPA, 
recognizing that “individuals’ privacy rights, public safety interests, and 
commercial freedoms of speech and trade must be balanced in a way that 
protects the privacy of individuals and permits legitimate telemarketing 
practices.”210 The Robocall Challenge aims to search out a technical 
solution to reduce robocalls; the ideal solution, however, needs to be a 
technical solution that involves cooperation between telephone service 
providers and the government, easy reporting methods for consumers who 
receive consistent robocalls, and a streamlined statutory and regulatory 
structure that enables clear easy-to-understand preventative measures and 
enforcement of violations. Ideally, a multi-faceted approach would 
anticipate changes in technology so that consumers are at peace from 
“Rachel” for years to come. 
A. Unified Federal Telemarketing Rulemaking Structure 
This Note advocates a moratorium on additional rulemaking by both 
the FTC and FCC until Congress takes action to give sole authority for 
telemarketing regulation to one agency. This act should focus first on 
transparency.211 With duplicative regulation coming from the TCPA and 
the TCFAPA, which addressed many of the same topics within a five-year 
span, transparency in telemarketing regulation has not been present since 
the early 1990s. Although at the beginning, the Do Not Call Registry aimed 
to maximize consistency, the duplicative and complicated rulemaking 
procedures that the FTC and FCC used throughout the early 2000s have 
only led to more confusion among consumers, the media, and 
telemarketing companies. In effect, by taking action to create a new and 
transparent telemarketing act, Congress would essentially be following its 
own demand in regards to consistencies. When Congress revised the 
TCFAPA in 2003, it called for the FTC and the FCC to issue new 
regulations and stated that Congress should enact legislation that will offer 
consumers necessary protection from telemarketing deception and 
abuse.”212 FCC Commissioner Clyburn spoke to this reactive nature of 
regulation in 2012: although she wrote that the FCC was “carrying out 
Congress’ intent to ensure that the FCC’s rules regarding telemarketing 
‘robocalls’ are harmonized with those of the Federal Trade 
Commission.”213 Clyburn also noted that “[t]his effort makes additional 
 
210. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CG DOCKET NO. 02-278, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND 
REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 
1991, at 20 (June 26, 2003) (explaining the objectives of the order).  
211. Miller, supra note 49, at 248. 
212. See Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
6101 (2006) (outlining the three ways Congress intended to create more effective 
regulation in this field).    
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good sense because . . . Congress told us to do it!”214  After such 
inconclusive regulations, constant revisions, and confusing standards, a 
concrete national standard for prohibiting deceptive telemarketing–one that 
would preempt state regulations–is the best legal remedy to combat 
robocalls. Otherwise, the patchwork regulation among the states and the 
two federal agencies makes legal compliance difficult as a unified standard 
would make enforcement of robocalls easier.215 
Because the FTC currently administers the Do Not Call Registry, leads 
enforcement actions, and introduced the Robocall Challenge, the FTC is 
the best-equipped agency to hold rulemaking power over telemarketing. As 
evidenced by the FTC’s enforcement actions targeting illegitimate, 
fraudulent telemarketers,216 any act that delegates sole rulemaking power to 
the FTC must prohibit deceptive telemarketing calls. While not a complete 
ban, an act that forbids fraudulent calls would pass constitutional muster 
and appropriately balance the interests of businesses and consumers. While 
opponents may argue that an exemption for calls from “legitimate” 
companies is illegally based on content, other similar restrictions, such as 
the exemptions for political robocalls and calls for charitable solicitations 
are constitutional.217 Because the “government may ban forms of 
communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it,”218 a 
prohibition against deceptive callers that exempts legitimate companies 
also holds up under the Central Hudson test.219 As FTC and FCC 
statements show, the government has a direct interest in reducing 
fraudulent telemarketing though regulation and enforcement. Because an 
act that would delegate rulemaking authority to the FTC alone would ban 
fraudulent robocalls–not all robocalls–it would also be narrowly tailored 
and not more extensive than necessary to serve the interests of the 
government, consumers, and the businesses at stake. While the act might 
hurt the efforts of telemarketers intending to defraud consumers, it would 
reduce the number of robocalls that reach consumers while still enabling 
small businesses to place legitimate robocalls. Ideally, such a targeted act 
would create both a “victory for consumers” and a “win for industry.”220 
An act that bans deceptive robocallers would end regulatory uncertainty, 
 
214. Id.  
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streamline enforcement actions, and reduce consumer and business 
confusion that ultimately contributes to the rise in robocalls.  
B. Do Not Call Registry Reevaluation and Consumer Education 
There are other practical solutions that do not require an act of 
Congress. Specifically, the utility of the Do Not Call list needs to be re-
evaluated regarding its utility in combatting fraudulent telemarketing calls. 
At ten years in existence, the use of the registry has helped decrease the 
number of telemarketing calls from legitimate companies: “consumer 
surveys show that consumers perceive that the Registry has been very 
effective in reducing unwanted telemarketing calls, it is also true that 
consumers who have listed their telephone numbers on the Registry 
continue to get unwelcome, unsolicited calls.”221 Consumers report general 
familiarity with the Registry: an October 2007 poll “reported that 86% of 
survey participants were familiar with the Registry, and 72% reported that 
they had registered their telephone numbers.”222  
Although general familiarity with the registry exists, many consumers 
are confused about what to do when they receive a robocall. In this regard, 
the Do Not Call Registry’s ease of use cannot be topped by any other 
remedy. As a fully automated system that can be completed quickly and 
easily, the Registry currently provides two ways to register a complaint: an 
interactive voice response system accessed by a toll-free telephone number 
and an internet-based system.223 The FTC has instigated a number of 
targeted education campaigns to educate consumers about the utility of the 
Do Not Call Registry;224 as the Registry reaches a decade in age, additional 
educational campaigns are warranted. Even if robocalls cannot be reduced 
in any other way, more educated consumers that report fraudulent robocalls 
(even if reported numbers end up being spoofed) may bolster the FTC’s 
enforcement efforts and ultimately reduce robocalls. Even this little effort 
could reduce robocalls; because “the FTC believes that the robocall 
industry has very low margins . . .  even small steps toward decreasing the 
effectiveness of robocalls or driving up their costs could wipe out the 
market.”225 
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C. Balanced Assessment of Robocall Challenge Solution 
If the FTC choses a technical solution from the Robocall Challenge to 
reduce robocalling, that solution must join seamlessly with the Do Not Call 
Registry and existing telemarketing regulations. Initial reviews of the 
proposals are not optimistic. While the challenge received many valid 
submissions, “most of the actual submissions fell short of genius[, and] . . . 
[t]he submission gallery is littered with half serious proposals . . . as well as 
incoherent ramblings . . . and dubious claims  . . . Many proposals are 
lacking in details and riddled with typos.”226 The most common submission 
was to simply dial a number to report the call, “which the FTC is 
considering–it just requires cooperation from carriers who would have to 
agree to a single standard, then agree to a mechanism for transferring the 
data to the government.”227 Ultimately, the best solution is “going to take 
time, negotiation with carriers, and infrastructure changes.”228 Whatever 
solution is chosen from the robocall challenge, the ideal solution must 
adapt to changing technology; in five or ten years, telemarketing might be 
phased out by another direct-to-phone marketing technique. While 
telemarketing may take place over landline telephones today, “Rachel” and 
“Ann” may soon invade other forms of communication; essentially, there is 
“a move towards that Facebookian world where a message is a message is 
a message and there is no differentiation between lengths and genres, 
platforms and devices.”229  
The FTC announced two winners to the Robocall Challenge in April 
2013, after the agency received nearly 800 submissions. Both of the 
proposals by the winning individuals, Serder Danis and Aaron Foss,230 
“focus on intercepting and filtering out illegal prerecorded calls using 
technology to ‘blacklist’ robocaller phone numbers and ‘whitelist’ numbers 
associated with acceptable incoming calls.”231 Foss’s proposed solution is 
called Nomorobo.232 The free service is a cloud-based mechanism that uses 
“simultaneous ringing” to allow analysis of the frequency of incoming calls 
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and appropriate blocking of offending numbers.233 Details about privacy 
concerns, intellectual property issues are yet to be fleshed out. However, 
Charles Harwood, acting director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer 
Protection, stated that “[t]he solutions that our winners came up with have 
the potential to turn the tide on illegal robocalls.”234 Ultimately, these 
technical robocall solutions will be integrated into the four prongs of the 
FTC’s robocall action plan: 1) continuing law enforcement aggressively; 2) 
gathering evidence strategically; 3) holding summits with law enforcement, 
industry members, and other stakeholders; and 4) pursuing other 
technological solutions.235 The pursuit of these goals, along with the 
technical solutions developed through the Robocall Challenge, represent a 
step in the right direction to reduce robocalls. 
CONCLUSION 
Consumers may continue to receive calls from “Rachel” in the 
immediate future, but realistic remedies exist to reduce and regulate 
robocalls. Although duplicative and inconsistent regulation have 
contributed to confusion and inefficient federal telemarketing policy, a 
unified and concrete regulatory approach that supports the First 
Amendment rights of both the consumer and the marketer and is backed by 
targeted enforcement efforts and proactive preventative technical remedies 
will help to reduce robocalls. While commercial telemarketing calls may be 
the bane of some families’ existences, thoughtful remedies that reduce the 
number of these calls will ultimately protect consumers’ right to peace and 
quiet.  
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